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Abstract. This paper proposes a cheat sensitive quantum bit commitment (CSQBC)
scheme based on single photons, in which Alice commits a bit to Bob. Here, Bob only
can cheat the committed bit with probability close to 0 with the increasing of used
single photons’ amount. And if Alice altered her committed bit after commitment
phase, she will be detected with probability close to 1 with the increasing of used
single photons’ amount. The scheme is easy to be realized with nowadays technology.
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1. Introduction
Bit commitment (BC) is a cryptographic task between two participants, which has a lot
of applications to crucial cryptographic protocols including interactive zero-knowledge
proof [1, 2, 3, 4], coin flipping [5, 6, 7], oblivious transfer [8, 9], multiparty secure
computation [10, 11, 12, 13], and so on.
Generally, BC mainly consists of two phases, commitment phase and opening
phase. In commitment phase, Alice chooses a bit b (b = 0 or 1) which she wants
to commit to Bob, and gives him some encrypted information about the bit, which
can not be decrypted by him before opening phase. Later, in opening phase, Alice
announces some information for decrypting b and the value of b. After decryption, Bob
obtains an output b′. The commitment would be accepted by Bob if b′ = b . Otherwise,
the commitment would be rejected if b′ 6= b . Bit commitment must meet the following
needs: Correctness. Bob should always accept with b′ = b if both participants are
honest. Sealing. Before opening phase, Bob can not know b. Binding. Alice can not
change b’s value after the commitment phase.
There are several quantum approaches [5, 14] have been considered to guarantee
the unconditional security of quantum BC (QBC) protocols, such as quantum key
distribution (QKD) protocols [15, 16, 17]. Unfortunately, it was concluded that
unconditionally secure QBC can never be achieved in principle, which was referred to
as the Mayers-Lo-Chau (MLC) no-go theorem [18, 19, 20]. Although unconditional
secure QBC protocols are not existent, there are several schemes satisfying special
security models, such as cheat sensitive protocol, relativistic protocol, have been
proposed [21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31]. Among them, an important class is
cheat sensitive QBC (CSQBC) which is proposed by L. Hardy and A. Kent [21] first.
In CSQBC, assuming that the commitment will eventually be opened, Bob cannot alter
the committed bit after the commitment phase without risking Bob’s detection, and
Alice cannot extract information about the committed bit before the opening phase
without risking Bob’s detection as well. In other words, cheat sensitivity means that all
the cheat strategies should be detected with nonzero probability in the protocol.
In this paper, we propose a variant CSQBC scheme based on single photons. In
the scheme, cheat sensitive is one-way, which is only available in binding. If Alice alters
her committed bit, she will be detected with probability close to 1 with the amount’s
increasing of used single photons. As for sealing, Bob only can cheat the committed
bit with probability 1
2
+ ε, where ε is close to 0 with the amount’s increasing of used
single photons. When ε = 0, the one-way CSQBC is more secure than the two-ways
CSQBC as the full sealing is more secure than cheat sensitive sealing. However, since
MLC no-go theorem said ε = 0 is impossible, we only could search for ε→ 0 in one-way
CSQBC.
This paper is organized as follows. Sec. II shows the one-way CSQBC scheme. In
Sec. III, we prove that the scheme is cheat sensitive in binding and approximate sealing.
And the protocol’s practicability is also analyzed. Finally, Sec. IV is a short conclusion.
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2. The Quantum Bit Commitment Scheme
In this protocol, Alice will commit a bit b to Bob. Single photons will be used by them,
each of which is prepared as one of the four states {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} randomly where
|0〉 and |1〉 are the two eigenstates of the Pauli operator σz, |+〉 and |−〉 are the two
eigenstates of the Pauli operator σx. For the cheat sensitive in binding and approximate
sealing, error correcting code (ECC) will be used here. The specific steps of the protocol
are described as follows:
[Pre-commitment phase]
(1) Alice and Bob agree on a ECC (n, k, d)-code C [32], which uses n bits codeword
to encode k bits word, and the distance between any two codewords is d.
(2) Alice chooses a nonzero random n-bit string r = (r1, r2, · · · , rn) where ri ∈ {0, 1}
and announces it to Bob. Alice uses it to divide all the n-bit codeword c = (c1c2 · · · cn)
in C into two subsets C(0) ≡ {c ∈ C|c ⊙ r = 0} and C(1) ≡ {c ∈ C|c ⊙ r = 1}, where
c⊙ r ≡ n⊕
i=1
ci ∧ ri.
(3) Bob prepares an ordered n photons sequence s = (s1, s2, · · · , sn), in which each
si is randomly in one of the four states (|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉). Then Bob sends the photons
sequence s to Alice.
[Commitment phase]
(4) According to the commitment bit b, Alice chooses a codeword c from C(b)
randomly.
(5) When ci = 0, Alice measures the i-th photon si in basis Z. Else when
ci = 1, Alice measures the i-th photon si in basis X . Then she obatins the outcomes
o = (o1, o2, · · · , on), where oi ∈ {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉}.
(6) When oi ∈ {|0〉, |+〉}, Alice sets o′i = 0. When oi ∈ {|1〉, |−〉}, Alice sets o′i = 1.
Then Alice announces o′ = (o′1, o
′
2, · · · , o′t) to Bob.
[Opening phase]
(7) Alice announces committed bit b, o and c to Bob.
(8) Bob checks whether o is right or not. The rule is that when o′i = 0 (or 1), it
should be oi ∈ {|0〉, |+〉} (or {|1〉, |−〉}). Then Bob checks whether c⊙ r = b or not. If
both of them are right, he accepts the committed bit. Else, he rejects the committed
bit.
3. Analysis
In the presented protocol, without considering the noise in the quantum channels and
equipments, Bob will always accept Alice’s committed bit as c ⊙ r = b when both of
them are honest.
However, as a quantum bit commitment protocol, Alice and Bob do not trust to
each other, furthermore, one of them may be dishonest and perform cheat strategies.
So we will analyze the scheme’s security in the following two cases, (1) a dishonest
Alice and an honest Bob, (2) a dishonest Bob and an honest Alice. Generally, the case
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that neither Alice nor Bob is honest will not be considered since it will be a quantum
gambling.
And the real-life setting will bring some troubles to the protocol. In this section,
we will analyze the protocol’s practicability following its security analysis.
3.1. Cheat sensitive binding
In the protocol, ECC (n, k, d)-code C is used, in which the distance between any two
codewords is d. It means that Alice should change d bits in c if she wants to alter
committed bit b to b′, where b, b′ ∈ {0, 1} and b 6= b′. Further, Alice could use the slyest
strategy, in which she first commits a bit b′′ other than 0 or 1, i.e., she choose a bit string
c′ which is contained in neither C(0) nor C(1), and let the Hamming distance between c′
and any one of C(0) and C(1) be d/2. Then she only needs to change d/2 bits in c
′ to
cheat b = 0 or b = 1.
When Alice announces o′, it means that she had committed something regardless
whether she has measured the photons or not. In the opening phase, what she should
do is to make o, and c tally with o′ and her wanted b. For instance, if she wants to
cheat b = 0, c should be one in the set C(0). We know that both of oi = |0〉 and |+〉
(oi = |1〉 and |−〉) are possible when o′i = 0 (or o′i = 1), so 2n different o are legal
corresponding to one o′. Then the cheat strategy degenerates to a simpler thing: Bob
sends a photon in one of states {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} to Alice. Alice could do anything on
it, then she should say whether the state is in the set {|0〉, |+〉} or {|1〉, |−〉}. If she is
right, she could cheat successfully with probability 1 as the states in the set are always
legal. But if she is wrong, her cheating will be detected with probability 1/2, as she can
avoid to be detected when her announced basis is wrong but be detected with certainty
when her announced basis is right.
Now we analyze how can Alice distinguish the single photon from the sets {|0〉, |+〉}
and {|1〉, |−〉}. Since the photon is always hold in Alice’s hand, she would not use any
ancilla states, but measure the photon directly. We suppose the measurement basis is
{|r0〉, |r1〉}, where |r0〉 = cos θ|0〉 + sin θ|1〉 and |r1〉 = sin θ|0〉 − cos θ|1〉. It should be
that
|0〉 = cos θ|r0〉+ sin θ|r1〉, (1a)
|1〉 = sin θ|r0〉 − cos θ|r1〉, (1b)
|+〉 = cos(pi
4
− θ)|r0〉 − sin(pi
4
− θ)|r1〉 (1c)
|−〉 = sin(pi
4
− θ)|r0〉+ cos(pi
4
− θ)|r1〉. (1d)
When the photon is |0〉 or |1〉, Alice could distinguish the two sets successfully with
probability cos2 θ. When the photon is |+〉 or |−〉, Alice would distinguish the two sets
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successfully with probability cos2(pi
4
− θ). So the total probability of Alice distinguishes
the two sets successfully is
P =
cos2 θ+cos2(pi
4
−θ)
2
= 2+sin 2θ+cos 2θ
4
=
2+
√
2 cos(pi
4
−2θ)
4
.
(2)
It should be that 2−
√
2
4
≤ P ≤ 2+
√
2
4
. If Alice distinguishes them unsuccessfully, Bob
will detect the cheating when his basis is same with what Alice announced. So Alice
will be detected with at least probability
1−( 2+
√
2
4
)
2
when she cheated on one photon.
As she must cheat on at least d/2 photons, she will be detected with probability
1− (1− 1−( 2+
√
2
4
)
2
)d/2 = 1− (6+
√
2
8
)d/2 for altering the committed bit. With the increasing
of d, the probability will be close to 1. Since d increases with the increasing of n
normally, it means that Alice will be detected with probability close to 1 with the
amount’s increasing of used single photons if she alters the committed bit.
3.2. Approximate sealing
Before the opening phase, a dishonest Bob might cheat Alice’s committed bit with the
states he sent and Alice’s announcement.
In fact, without any cheat strategies, a curious Bob could obtain some information
about oi. When the ith photon Bob sent is |0〉, if Alice said her measurement outcome
is in the set {|0〉, |+〉}, he can guess the basis Alice used is Z. Else if Alice said her
measurement outcome is in the set {|1〉, |−〉}, he can guess the basis Alice used is X .
With this way, he will success with probability 3/4 to obtain oi before the opening
phase. However, since the distance between any two code words in C(0) and C(1) is d,
Bob must obtain more than n− d bits to extract valid committed information. So Bob
could cheat successfully with probability (3
4
)n−d.
Bob has a more sufficient cheat strategy. Instead of sending a single photon to
Alice, Bob could cheat by sending one participle of an entangle state to Alice. After
she measured it, he measures his participle for analyzing oi. The best thing to him is
obtaining a same state as Alice’s, i.e, obtaining a photon in state |0〉 (or |1〉, or |+〉, or
|−〉), when oi = |0〉 (or |1〉, or |+〉, or |−〉). Then according to o′i, he calculates oi and
ci. For these, he should measure the state which is in one of {|0〉, |+〉} to make sure
what state it is.
The problem of optimal state estimation has been studied in great detail
previously[33], and in particular the optimal measurement for discriminating two density
operators[34] is well known. Using the optimal measurement, the maximum probability
that Bob estimates ci is
Pmax =
1
2
+
1
4
Tr|ρ|0〉 − ρ|+〉| = 1
2
+
√
2
4
(3)
, where |ρ|0〉−ρ|+〉| =
√
(ρ|0〉 − ρ|+〉)†(ρ|0〉 − ρ|+〉) , and (ρ|0〉−ρ|+〉)† is Hermitian conjugate
or adjoint of the (ρ|0〉 − ρ|+〉) matrix.
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So Bob could obtain ci with success probability
1
2
+
√
2
4
. Since the distance between
any two code words is d, Bob should know more than n − d bits to obtain valid
information. The probability of this case is (1
2
+
√
2
4
)n−d. Namely, Bob only can cheat
the committed bit with probability 1
2
+ ε, where ε is close to 0 with the increasing of
n − d. When ε → 0, Bob’s cheat strategy almost likes guessing. Since n − d increases
with the increasing of n normally, it means that Bob only can cheat the committed bit
with probability close to 0 with the increasing of used single photons’ amount.
3.3. Practicability
In the presented protocol, only BB84 states, X and Y bases measurements are used, all
of which can be implemented with nowadays technology. In QBC, the period between
commitment phase and opening phase may be very long. If quantum states are needed
to be stored during this period, the protocol will be difficult to realize with nowadays
technology. Here, quantum storages are not needed in the proposed QBC. So compared
with some protocols in which long-time quantum memories are used, our protocol is
more practicable.
Multi-photon is an important problem which has brought some troubles to practical
quantum protocols. Now we analyze its effect to the presented QBC. We first consider
the case happened in ith order. When Bob sends a pulse containing two photons, Alice
should measure one photon in basis X , the other in basis Z. If the two outcomes happen
to be {|0〉, |+〉} or {|1〉, |−〉}, she can cheat to ci = 0 and ci = 1 easily by announcing
o′i = 0 or o
′
i = 1 at step (6) and announce her wanted ci at step (7). However, if the
two outcomes happen to be {|0〉, |−〉} or {|1〉, |+〉}, Alice can not perform this cheating.
Namely, to one multi-photon, she could perform the cheating with probability 1/2. For
cheating successfully, Alice needs to change d/2 bits in c at least. When the multi-
photon rate ηm is less than
d
2
× 2 × 1
n
= d
n
, she could not cheat successfully. So Bob
should set the multi-photon rate of his source as a small enough value for secure.
The loss and error appearing in quantum channels and devices are another
important problems in practical quantum protocols. Here, Alice could said some pulse
which contains only one photon is lost. Then she has more chances to cheat. She also
could say some of the attacked bit as error bit. So the loss rate ηl and error rate ηe
could not be too large. It should be ηm
2
+ ηl + ηe ≪ d2n .
4. Conclusion
To summarize, in this paper, we have dealt with a quantum bit commitment protocol
based on single photons. In our scheme, Alice commits a value by performing some
measurements on the single photons which are sent from Bob. With the increasing of
photons’ amount, Bob only can cheat the committed bit with probability close to 0. On
the other hand, if Alice alters her committed bit after commitment phase, she will be
detected with probability close to 1 with the increasing of photons’ amount. It is easy
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to be realized with nowadays technology.
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